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CLOSE QUARTERS BATTLE: 
URBAN COMBAT AND ‘SPECIAL FORCIFICATION’ 
 
Introduction 
Urban warfare has been a feature of conflict as long as humans have lived in cities. However, 
the rapid and accelerating urbanization of the world’s population and the increasing 
preference of the west’s opponents to fight asymmetrically in cities have precipitated a 
potentially profound transformation in war in the last two decades:1 ‘Warfare, like everything 
else, is being urbanized’.2 Recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and current conflicts in 
Libya, Iraq, Syria and Ukraine would seem to confirm the growing salience of urban combat 
in this and future decades. Urban and street fighting was, of course, common during the 
major wars of twentieth century, as the battles over Stalingrad, Caen, Berlin, Seoul and Hue 
demonstrated. However, at that time, mass citizen armies were typically so large that they 
formed fronts around cities and it was on these fronts that most of the fighting took place 
simply because that is where the bulk of the forces were able to congregate. Today, because 
armed forces are so much smaller, force densities have declined dramatically, transforming 
the geometry of the battlefield. In this situation, urban combat has become proportionately 
more significant not only because of rising urban populations and the asymmetric attractions 
afforded by the city but because downsized forces can no longer form fronts. Today, 
opposing forces are necessarily drawn together on the key terrain to fight over decisive points 
in cities or particular parts of cities.  
Up to now, scholars have conducted invaluable work on urban warfare and its future. 
However, for understandable reasons, they have been primarily interested in the evident 
operational and political difficulties of urban combat. In particular, they have plausibly 
claimed that because of the unique complexity of cities, political and cultural understanding 
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is likely to prove essential for military success.3 The point is well taken. Yet, there is an 
obvious gap in the literature of urban warfare. Advanced digital technologies, so central to 
western and, above all, American military dominance, are less relevant in the urban 
environment.4 Consequently, in the city, troops will be forced to rely primarily on their 
training and skill. Yet, tactical developments at the level of the small infantry unit have 
tended to be ignored by scholars, even though they have widely claimed that the fighting at 
this level is decisive for success in cities. Hills and Kilcullen briefly mention urban 
techniques in the margins of their work but do not discuss it at length.5 Despite their 
extensive research on the urban operations of the IDF6, Eyal Ben Ari et al. have concentrated 
on the company and battle-group level; they have not analysed urban combat tactics at the 
micro-level of the platoon, squad and fire-team. Yet, in Iraq and Afghanistan, some of the 
most interesting developments in urban combat has occurred precisely at this level.7  
This article aims to address this omission. It provides an analysis of new urban tactics 
at the small unit level specifically focusing, not on the seizure of cities, but on the new 
techniques which western infantries have adopted to clear individual rooms. It aims to show 
how new skills have been developed by and disseminated among western forces in the face of 
the urban challenge. Specifically the article explores the promulgation of ‘Close Quarters 
Battle’ (CQB) tactics. CQB refers to precision urban tactics at the level of the infantry squad, 
first developed by the Special Forces in the 1970s, that have been adopted by regular western 
infantry forces as a result of the special demands of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This paper seeks to provide a micro-sociology of these skills. In this way, this article aims to 
make an empirical contribution, analyzing military practices which have been previously 
ignored in the liteature. Given the importance of urban combat in recent campaigns and its 
likely importance on future operations, such a contribution would seem to be valuable in 
itself.  
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However, the paper also simultaneously aims to contribute to the analysis of 
contemporary military professionalization much more widely. Many scholar have noted that 
urban combat requires highly professionalized troops and an increased the role for Special 
Forces.8 Indeed, in their work on urban combat, Ben-Ari et al. propose an intriguing concept; 
they observe a process which they call ‘special forcification’.9 As a result of challenging 
urban operations against sophisticated opponents, regular IDF units have adopted methods 
and expertise once the exclusive preserve of the Special Forces.  
Ben-Ari’s concept of ‘special forcification’ has not been widely utilized but it is 
potentially suggestive, alluding to two separate but interconnected processes. Firstly, drawing 
on Huntington’s and Janowitz’s definitions of professionalism as a form of specialist and 
expert knowledge, special forcification refers the accumulation of skill and expertise. 
Through a micro-analysis of new urban techniques and training methods, this article explores 
a detailed example of special forcification. Secondly, Ben-Ari’s concept special forcification 
also speaks to broader institutional transformations in the armed forces. It is very easy to 
presume, in line with Huntington and Janowitz, that professionalism necessarily implies 
improvement and this is particularly the case with the process of special forcification. Since 
the Special Forces have attained a position of extraordinary prominence in western forces 
structures, anything associated with them is often assumed to represent an optimal 
development. It is important to avoid facile ameliorism. This article explores the process of 
special forcification in a second way. Special forcification here refers not to improvements in 
combat effectiveness but to the way in which the armed forces – and individual services, 
arms and regiments within them - employ professionalization to legitimate themselves, to 
protect their monopolies or to advance their interests. Special forcification, on this definition 
is not simply a matter of objective military improvement but of institutional self-promotion 
and status advancement. The article describes the distinctive features of CQB in order to 
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identify the operational and institutional motivations for its widespread adoption among 
western regular infantries.10 It begins with a detailed micro-analysis of the new practices 
before going onto a critical assessment of their institutional implications. 
 
The Research  
In order to analyse CQB as a form of expertise, it is necessary to generate an understanding 
of the specific skills it involves and how these have been utilised on urban operations against 
insurgents. This is methodologically challenging. Close combat has always presented a 
problem to the social sciences because it is often difficult to gain an accurate, reliable and 
representative account of the often confused and chaotic events on the battlefield. Urban 
combat compounds these problems of reliability and representativeness because in the urban 
environment, the micro-practices of CQB are executed inside buildings very quickly by small 
groups. In many cases, even members of the assault force do not witness the clearance of 
specific rooms; they are held outside or are clearing another part of the building. 
Consequently, in order to witness a specific clearance, an observer would have to be 
embedded in the assault squad entering the building and indeed individual rooms at the same 
time as soldiers themselves. Such a level of embeddedness would not only be highly 
dangerous (for an untrained civilian) but no military would allow the presence of a civilian in 
a small and specialised assault force since it would significantly reduce the effectiveness of 
the squad. Even if an observer were embedded into an assault unit, it would still be necessary 
to corroborate particular actions against other cases in order to ensure representativeness.  
Accordingly, in order to generate an evidenced account of CQB and to explain how it 
represents an example of special forcification, two requirements must be filled. It is necessary 
to gain a detailed understanding of the official doctrine and practice of CQB as well as its 
pedagogy. Training is optimal here since it depicts CQB in its ideal, institutionalised form, 
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and shows how it is currently inculcated. However, although training is realistic, it is not real. 
Consequently, in order to understand the operational application of CQB, evidence from 
training has to be corroborated against accounts of its actual usage on military operations in 
urban combat to ensure that the methods, which are officially taught are those which have 
actually been practiced in close combat.  In order to address both these requirements, this 
article is based on two methods of data collection; ethnographic observation and interviews. 
CQB training was observed across the major NATO power; in Germany 
(Hammelburg, 5 days), Canada (Gagetown, 5 days), the United States (29 Palms and Infantry 
Immersion Trainer, Camp Pendleton, 6 days), France (CENZUB, 5 days) and the United 
Kingdom (Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, 8 days, Stanford Training Area 
Norfolk, 3 days, Sennybridge Training Area, 1 day, Police Training Facility, Okehampton, 1 
day and Salisbury Plain Training Area, 1 day). In all, I observed 33 days of urban training in 
five countries. Because the training involved the use of blank or ‘simunition’ rounds, it was 
possible to observe CQB tactics at close range, following assaults into the building or, on 
occasions, witnessing assaults from inside rooms as they were attacked.  
The most important site of observation was at the Royal Marines Commando Training 
Centre at Lympstone in Devon, UK for two reasons. Firstly, I was able to observe 10 days of 
the Royal Marines Modern Urban Combat course, over two courses in May and September 
2011. Secondly, the Royal Marines have constructed a special CQB instruction facility, the 
‘Compound’, which consists of a series of rooms and half-rooms in which urban micro-
tactics are taught and developed (see Figure 1). Crucially, the Compound featured a viewing 
gantry. The gantry was designed for the benefit of instructors, affording them with a perfect 
view of students on the course, as they cleared rooms; it represented an ideal location for 
research.  As a result, the Royal Marines Compound became the prime ethnographic 
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fieldwork site (producing the best and most extensive data), supported by material from the 
Canadian Army, the French Army, the US Marine Corps and the German Army.  
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
Figure 1. The Compound. Note that the directing staff on the back wall are using the body 
armour to body armour drill to cover potential threats, behind the sofa and the hidden corners 
(See discussion below). This is the room which caused students difficulty when the directing 
staff re-organized the layout. The directing staff had opened the door, in the foreground and 
reorganized the closed wooden barricade beside the directing staff to the left, so that it had a 
door leading into a small oblong alcove. The doors to the alcove and to the adjacent room 
were, therefore, opposite each, presenting equal and simultaneous threats (See discussion 
below). 
Typically when conducting an international study, there is a problem of comparison; 
practices at one site are not corroborated at another and findings from one location cannot be 
transposed. This research does not minimise the problems of international comparison and 
the Royal Marines cannot be taken as a global standard, their techniques replicated 
transparently everywhere else. On the contrary, a number of differences emerged between the 
British Royal Marines, the United States Marines, the Canadian Army and the French Army, 
reflecting national military cultures. However, there has been close interaction between these 
military organizations, particularly between the US Marines and British Royal Marines and 
the Canadian and US Armies. Consequently, although there are differences in micro-
techniques; the parallels between their CQB methods are striking. On the basis of these 
observations, it was possible to develop an evidenced account of contemporary CQB doctrine 
and its instruction. 
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These observations were augmented with formal interviews with selected combat 
veterans who had used these techniques in combat in Afghanistan or Iraq and informal 
discussions with instructors and students on urban combat courses; formal interviews were 
recorded as they took place, while informal discussions were recorded in fieldnotes 
afterwards. These data included descriptions of training techniques and, most importantly, 
their utilization of these methods on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The research 
included formal interviews or informal discussions with 47 service personnel.11  
Table 1. Interviewees 
Number Royal  
Marines 
British Army US Special 
Forces 
German 
Army 
French 
Army 
11 5 1 2 1 1 
 
Table 2 Interlocutors 
Number  Royal 
Marines 
British 
Army 
Royal 
Air 
Force 
US 
Marines 
French 
Army 
Canadian 
Army 
German 
Army 
36 13 3 1 9 4 3 3 
 
The sample was random or rolling, based either on acquaintances developed during the 
fieldwork or introductions from other interlocutors. It might be claimed that the randomness 
of the sample potentially vitiated the reliability of the findings. The opposite case seems more 
likely. Precisely because most interlocutors were unknown to each other, were of different 
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nationalities and participated in different operations in often different theatres increased the 
chances that they would explain urban combat techniques in different ways. It was 
remarkable that overwhelmingly, excepting some minor differences in specific techniques, 
interviewees and interlocutors converged on their descriptions and explanations of urban 
tactics and training. However, there is a clear bias in the research which has to be recognised. 
The Royal Marines are over-represented in it both in terms of the number of interviewees and 
interlocutors. Because of the design of their urban training facility and of close relations with 
the directing staff of the Modern Urban Combat, the data from the Royal Marines were also 
qualitatively the richest. This is not significant in understanding new urban combat 
techniques, since other forces adopted very similar techniques, but it is relevant in terms of 
the organizational argument about special forcification. As an elite infantry force, the 
argument about special forcification and status is particularly applicable to them and some of 
the key evidence to support that evidence is derived from discussions with Royal Marines.  
 
The Origins and Dissemination of CQB 
Before analysing CQB techniques and its institutional implications, it is clearly necessary to 
provide a brief account of its origins. Although in the case of each nation, the precise 
processes of diffusion, often along transnational networks, were both complex and specific, 
the broad history of the invention of CQB and its subsequent promulgation are well-
documented. Although NATO periodically expressed an interest in urban warfare during the 
Cold War12, there was no systematic investment in urban combat especially at the small unit 
level at that time.13 Urban warfare became an area of concerted concern only with the 
experiences of Grozny and Mogadishu in the mid-1990s; at that point, there was significant 
discussion in military journals of the problems posed by urban combat, especially against an 
irregular enemy.14 Nevertheless, once again, there was no significant change to military 
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training for regular forces and, indeed, little fundamental tactical change from the Second 
World War.15 Indeed, as Alice Hills rightly observed in 2004, urban tactics had remained 
‘remarkably similar for sixty years’.16 For instance, although the US Marines, one of the 
most forward-leaning of western forces in this area, had developed their combined infantry-
tank doctrine under ‘Project Metropolis’ while adopting the ‘multiple’ system which the 
British army had developed in Northern Ireland for patrolling cities in peace-enforcement 
operations, small unit urban tactics remained unchanged.17 Urban combat doctrine in the 
1990s prescribed the profligate use of grenades and automatic fire to clear rooms just as it 
did in 1944: ‘Get in fast; fire automatic. As soon as the hand grenade goes off, rush into the 
room as fast as possible. The first man into the room can observe the entire room. He should 
engage any targets with short bursts of autonomic fire’.18  
Innovation among the regular infantry did not occur until the mid-2000s with the 
period 2004 to 2007 being decisive, specifically in response to operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Close Quarters Battle did not, therefore, evolve from conventional twentieth 
century infantry doctrine; it had quite different origins. Specifically, CQB was developed in 
the 1970s and was bound up with the emergence of the Special Forces at that time.19 
Following the Munich Olympic crisis of 1972 and the growth of international terrorism 
across Europe, western governments began to develop specialist counter-terrorist units 
capable of conducting hostage rescue missions; the SAS, Delta Force, Seal Team 6, 
Groupement de Securite et d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale, Grenzeschutzgruppe 
(GSG) 9 and Joint Task Force 2 all appeared in the light of this threat.20 Close transnational 
connections developed between these groups so that they shared tactics and procedures, 
trained and, in some cases, conducted joint operations together.21 Between 1972 and 1976, 
these Special Forces units developed new methods of assaulting buildings, planes and ships 
in order to eliminate terrorists while minimising the risks to their hostages. These methods of 
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rapid entry and precision marksmanship became known as CQB. They were most famously 
utilised in the SAS’s assault on the Iranian Embassy in London in May 1980.  
For approximately three decades after 1972, these Close Quarters Battle techniques 
remained the preserve of the Special Forces and specialist para-military or gendamerie units, 
such as French counter-terrorist units or American SWAT teams; designed specifically for 
hostage rescue, CQB was not taught to conventional infantry. It is true that in the US Marine 
Corps, which eschewed a Special Forces capability until 2006, CQB techniques were adopted 
by the US Marine Force Reconnaissance Companies from the mid- to late 1980s. However, 
providing a highly skilled deep reconnaissance capability to the Marine Expeditionary 
Forces, these companies, directly responsible to the three-star MEF commander, could hardly 
be described as regular infantry.22 Moreover, the CQB techniques the Marines Force Recon 
Companies adopted were derived from the US Special Forces.  
However, initially in response to new challenges in the Balkans and experiences in 
Mogadishu and Grozny, dramatically accelerated by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since 
2003, the Special Forces monopoly began to be broken at the small unit level. A crucial event 
here was the 2004 US Marine assault on Fallujah. Following the murder of four US 
contractors in the city, political pressure was exerted on the US forces to suppress the 
insurgency in the city and to re-establish control of it.23 In the event, the US Marines adopted 
a conventional combined arms approach to this urban operation, causing many civilian 
casualties and much collateral damage. Specifically, ignorance of precision techniques at the 
squad and platoon level was seen to have resulted in many unnecessary deaths.  
Fallujah was certainly an important episode in the dissemination of CQB tactics, not 
only for the American but also for their allies, especially in the America-Britain-Canada-
Australia (ABCA) alliance, but it was not the only precipitating factor. For the British armed 
forces, their increasingly difficult experiences in Basra, especially from 2004, re-awakened 
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their concern about urban operations. The deployment to Helmand only affirmed the salience 
of urban fighting where they were involved in bitter struggles especially in towns like 
Sangin.24 For the Canadians, who took responsibility for Kandahar province, including the 
city of Kandahar itself, the single-most important population centre outside of Kabul, the 
special demands of urban operations also quickly became apparent. Operational realities have 
propelled the dissemination of CQB tactics, which had once been the preserve of Special 
Operations Forces.  
 
Individual Drills 
As we have seen, traditional urban combat methods from the 1940s to 1990s involved the 
profligate use of machine-gun fire and grenades to clear rooms. These techniques are now 
widely disparaged as ‘spraying and praying’ and are rejected as unprofessional (i.e. unskilful 
and indiscriminate). Their shortcomings have become very evident in the last decade. Firstly, 
in the non-permissive urban environments in which western forces have been operating, 
throwing grenades or spraying machine-gun fire into a building indiscriminately was likely to 
inflict civilian casualties. In Iraq and Afghanistan, even relatively small numbers of collateral 
casualties have had major reputational repercussions for western forces. There has been an 
imperative to reduce these accidental deaths and it is in this changing context that CQB has 
been developed as a solution.  
 Secondly, and more surprisingly, sprayed fire, although apparently devastating, is far 
less effective than it seems. Although impressively noise, it is highly inaccurate. On 10 
November during the Second Battle of Fallujah, Staff Sergeant David Bellavia, of the 2nd 
Battalion, 2nd Infantry, attempted to clear a house in the Jolan District on his own. On 
entering a down-stairs room, Bellavia’s weapon, a light belt-fed machine gun, went 
‘cyclical’; in all, he fired some five hundred rounds into the room in which at least one 
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insurgent was taking cover behind an improvised barricade.25 Despite the extreme close range 
and the number of rounds fired, Bellavia did not hit anyone. Although perhaps comforting to 
the firer and seemingly effective, sprayed fire has been often proved to be ineffective in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  
In the 1970s, as the Special Forces developed their counter-terrorist techniques, 
various tactical requirements became clear for success in the urban environment, a principal 
one of which was accurate shooting. The Special Forces prioritized precision marksmanship 
on hostage rescue operations because they had to minimize civilian casualties. Accuracy 
remains central to CQB today; ‘Precision is the key. You have to be accurate. You will be 
kicked out of your unit if you miss twice.  It happens in the fog of war but with surgical 
shooting, you just can’t afford to have a mistake’.26 Improved marksmanship has, in turn, 
required a major reformation of military pedagogy. Indeed, special forcification is particular 
pronounced in these new training methods. In his description of his training for Vietnam in 
the United States Marines Corp, Eisenhardt provides a disturbing picture of abuse, 
harassment and bullying and, while Eisenhardt served in a mass conscripted force27, military 
training in professional forces even to the present day often remains similarly rough. This has 
often produced tough troops capable of conducting simple conventional infantry tactics. 
However, this approach is now seen as inadequate to the instruction of CQB and especially 
the precision marksmanship which is central to it. Accordingly, many soldiers and marines 
now draw a distinction between traditional military training and professionalized CQB 
instruction: ‘When I was training, the coaching [for shooting] was terrible. Basically, it was 
remedial phys [physical instruction]. If you shot badly, you were made to run’.28 Poor 
shooting was seen as some sort of moral or disciplinary weakness, best remedied by physical 
punishment. Yet, it is now recognised that precision shooting is an acquired skill which 
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demands an entirely different approach to training. The new pedagogy is defined by two 
features, then: careful attention to posture and progressive repetition.  
 In his analysis of Special Operations Forces, Rune Henriksen has prioritised the 
inherent warrior qualities of these soldiers: ‘The SOF approach to warrior selection implies 
that warriors are revealed and that they cannot be made’.29 For him, special forcification is an 
individualized process and, certainly, some CQB skills, like marksmanship, are individual. 
Yet, even when considering individual marksmanship, it would be difficult to describe the 
training as individualized or to presume that it was merely uncovering already existing 
talents. Demonstrating the new pedagogy, instructors inculcated standardised and established 
shooting techniques onto all their students precisely because these methods have been proven 
to be the most effective. They were not trying to reveal hidden qualities but to impose proven 
and standardised methods. Instructors sought to deduce specific errors in comportment, 
breathing and concentration by observing the fall of shots on the target: ‘If the individual is 
not hitting the mark, you must turn around and watch the individual from the side and back. 
You try and analyse what he is doing wrong? You are watching for the way he was holding 
the weapon, watching for the body reaction when he fires? Was he breathing? You can 
deduce errors from where the shots fall. You see the mistakes very clearly’.30 There are 
standard mistakes which will cause shots to fall high, low or wide which instructors, like 
sports coaches, become adept at identifying. In this way, CQB instructors aimed to eliminate 
poor individual habits by examining the micro-techniques of students and enforcing optimal 
posture on them. They effectively inscribed collective and institutionalized techniques on the 
individual. 
The special forcification of military pedagogy was particularly obvious with pistol-
shooting, a weapon with which most soldiers are typically less familiar and which is more 
difficult to shoot accurately because of its short barrel. Consequently, on CQB courses, 
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substantial time is dedicated to developing the appropriate levels of skill with a pistol. During 
one Royal Marines course, for instance, an experienced corporal failed on his pistol shoot, 
recording scores well below the required standard. Unused to pistol shooting (although he 
had served in Iraq and Helmand where he had been involved in numerous fire-fights), he held 
the weapon incorrectly.31 Specifically, his thumbs pointed apart from each other and up in the 
air when he fired. The thumbs should, in fact, be aligned along the side of the pistol, with the 
right thumb overlaying the knuckle of the left thumb, with both nails pointing upward. By 
pointing his thumbs upwards, the instructors noted that the corporal loosened his grip on the 
pistol just as it fired, causing his shots to go high, as the weapon recoiled in his hand. This 
fault was corrected in a private one-on-one training session. A US Special Forces soldier 
recorded a similar experience; although he had always been a reasonable shot, it became clear 
during advanced training that his thumbs were not aligned properly along the side of the 
pistol. Like the Royal Marine corporal, once his instructor had noted the fault, his shooting 
improved immediately without any additional effort.32 On ranges across NATO, a new 
pedagogy is observable in which soldiers are no longer punished for shooting badly but their 
micro-errors of posture and comportment are subjected to analysis and remedial training. In 
each case, a highly refined but standardized institutional ideal was imposed on students.  
 CQB has required a pedagogical innovation but it has also involved a significant 
refinement about how the urban environment itself is understood. In order to be able to 
engage a target accurately, soldiers need to adopt advantageous tactical positions from which 
to shoot. Soldiers might be brilliant shots but if they have no awareness of how to protect 
themselves as they clear buildings, they will be killed or wounded before their skills can be 
utilised. Soldiers are typically adept at finding cover in the natural environment but the use of 
cover is not nearly so obvious inside buildings. There, it is a refined skill where small and 
apparently irrelevant differences make a huge difference to the outcome. To this end, 
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significant investment was made by instructors to develop soldiers’ comprehension of the 
urban environment. Specifically, they repeatedly described to their students that Close 
Quarters Battle inside buildings and structures was predominantly about ‘angles’. From a 
tactical perspective, buildings consist of a series of corners which are decisive in any fighting 
which takes place within them and differentiates urban from open warfare. Corners provide 
cover around which shots can be fired in relative safety but they are also extremely dangerous 
because, in order to shoot around a corner, it is necessary to expose oneself; opponents could 
already have their weapons trained on that point. Accordingly, success in the urban 
environment involves perfecting the art of exploiting corners; maximising the cover they 
provide while minimising the dangers of looking around them. It is here that ‘angles’ become 
important. By adjusting the angle at which a soldier stands back from the corner, it is possible 
to increase the arc of vision around a corner in a manner which puts an opponent at a 
consistent disadvantage. The exploitation of angles is an arcane but crucial skill for urban 
soldiers today. 
The use of arcs and angles is central to success in the urban environment and has been 
evident on actual military operations, perhaps most obviously during the assassination of Bin 
Laden by Seal Team 6. On that assault in Abbottobad, six individuals were killed by the Seal 
Team, all were shot from soldiers utilising the angle of corner or door post. This was most 
obvious in the case of Bin Laden himself. He was shot from the cover provided by the stair-
well which led to the third floor, as he exposed himself in the door-way: ‘We were less than 
five steps from getting to the top when I heard suppressed shots. Bop. Bop. The point man 
had seen a man [OBL] peeking out of the door on the right side of the hallway about ten feet 
in front of him’.33 Even then, the team were cautious, exploiting corners to protect 
themselves: ‘The point man reached the landing first and slowly moved toward the door. 
Unlike in the movies, we didn’t bound up the final few steps and rush into the room with 
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guns blazing. We took out time…We waited at the threshold and peered inside’.34 
Conventional forces have also sought to utilise the principle of angles and arcs on operations. 
In the summer of 2010, 40 Commando Royal Marines were stationed in Sangin, northern 
Helmand. The alleys around their patrol bases were extremely dangerous as they were 
favoured locations for IEDs or insurgent ambushes especially since they comprised many 
hidden junctions and corners. One of the sergeants in 40 Commando, a qualified CQB 
instructor, suggested that his troops employ CQB techniques in these alley-ways, instead of 
hugging the walls of the alleys especially when looking around corners, he sensitized them to 
the question of angles and arcs. If marines stepped back from the corner, they would actually 
be able to see further around them: ‘I spent a lot of time with my lads explaining, it’s all 
about angles and arcs’.35 The armed forces have deepened their understanding of the urban 
environment and its tactical exigencies.  
Close Quarters Battle relies upon two central individual skills, therefore: precise 
marksmanship and refined tactical positioning (the use of angles and arcs). Both have 
involved the development of a progressive training regimes which in itself represents a form  
of special forcification.  Interestingly, and against Henriksen’s account, although these are 
individual skills, they are developed through collective training processes when 
institutionally approved practices are imposed on students to optimise their performance. As 
a result, CQB-trained troops transnationally adopt precisely the same body posture and use 
the same weapon manipulation techniques. A standardized set of refined individual practices 
has been inscribed on soldiers across NATO so that precisely the same actions can be seen on 
ranges in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. The dissemination of CQB 
across western forces in the last ten years demonstrates the process of special forcification 
identified by Ben-Ari et al.; urban combat methods have been refined and improved and, in 
order to inculcate this expertise, a progressive pedagogy has been developed. 
 17 
 
Collective Drills 
So far, only individual CQB skills have been discussed. These individual skills are critical to 
combat performance in the urban environment but not only is their development dependent 
upon collective institutional processes but urban tactics relies above all else on team-work. 
Specifically, it is useful to comprehend urban combat as a collective action problem of a 
classical sociological type36: that is, a problem which can be resolved only through 
coordinated social practice (i.e. by a group co-operating rather than by an individual acting 
alone). Once this approach is adapted, the process of special forcification of western forces 
becomes particularly obvious. Clearly, warfare generally involves collective action; armies 
have to unite their troops and commit them to common ends if they are to succeed. Yet, urban 
warfare represents a radically accentuated example of the collective action problem which 
can be recognised most clearly by comparing CQB with its nearest equivalent; conventional 
small unit tactics. In open warfare, an infantry platoon is typically tasked with eliminating a 
small enemy position usually consisting of a bunker or a trench. The platoon addresses one 
threat. Since the terrain is normally open and the squads can maintain their assault 
formations, the coordination of the platoon is relatively straightforward. Of course, in the 
confusion of combat, even this relatively simple problem of coordination became very 
difficult. Nevertheless, the fundamentals of a platoon attack in open warfare are simple. The 
platoon commander has the choice of mounting a frontal or a left- or right-flanking attack, 
typically using one squad to provide fire support, one to assault and one in reserve. In 
conventional combat, there is a single threat (a position) or a few closely contiguous ones 
(two or three positions) which are neutralized by the selection of one of three options by the 
platoon commander.37  
The urban environment poses a quite different challenge which is fully recognised in 
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contemporary doctrine: ‘Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, 
interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and 
vegetation.’38 Urban combat involves two central problems. Firstly, buildings necessarily 
channel assault teams down corridors or stairwells, separating them as squads and fire-teams 
clear rooms individually. Unlike rural warfare, the sections and fire-teams can quickly 
become separated and dispersed, unable to see or hear one another. The urban environment 
breaks up regular combat formations, therefore, and generates role-turbulence among the 
assaulting force: each individual may find themselves at any position in the assault squad 
performing a suite of tasks. Furthermore, open warfare demands dispersion of troops in order 
to mitigate the effects of firepower. By contrast, in urban combat, troops are necessarily 
forced to operate in confined space in close proximity with each other, increasing the chances 
of physically interfering with each other (bumping into or knocking each other over) or 
injuring each other with rifles, pistols or grenades. It is exceptionally easy for assault troops 
to point or fire weapons at each other as they move around the constricted urban space with 
patently serious implications. 
Secondly, threats are multiplied at every point. There are numerous rooms which may 
contain enemies, booby-traps or civilians; the corridors and rooms lead off in multiple unseen 
directions all representing additional dangers. It is possible to be enfiladed from adjacent 
rooms or buildings. Stairwells, cellars, attics and furniture can all conceal dangers. An assault 
team is presented with a vexatious collective action problem, then. In each building and in 
each room, soldiers have to identify all the many threats, prioritize them in terms of their 
relative danger and assign team members to their neutralization in each room or corridor. As 
a result, trained CQB operators have explicitly developed the concept of ‘breaking down’ 
rooms. By this, they mean that rooms have to be classified so that threats in it are identified, 
prioritised and then assigned to team members.39 CQB consequently demands high levels of 
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coordination within the teams so that all necessary actions to neutralise threats are completed 
quickly, often simultaneously and without the need for excessive discussion. The emergence 
of heightened forms of collective expertise (team-work) constitutes a central part of the 
process of contemporary professionalization. 
In order to resolve the collective action problem which urban combat presents, 
soldiers always operate as part of a squad or a ‘stack’. A stack refers to the formation which 
an assault team makes as it enters a building. Typically, the assault team, of about four 
soldiers, will form a line outside a door or in a corridor before its assault; it will literally stack 
up behind the first soldier. The members of a stack remain in close physical proximity with 
each other so that each individual supports and covers the others. In effect, the ideal is that 
the stack operates as a unified team or even a single weapon system but this is only possible 
if the actions of the stack members are closely coordinated. Established drills are a central 
means of achieving this coordination; they are central to the process of special forcification. 
Drills resolve the collective action problem by establishing a predictable choreography of 
manoeuvres that an assault team and its members conduct in the face of specific threats. 
Precisely because troops respond with set procedures there is no need for deliberation and 
agreement; the process of coordination is expedited. This is essential in the adversarial urban 
environment when the tempo of response determines success and even survival. At the same 
time, in the constricted urban space, established manoeuvres are essential so that the team 
members are able to adopt the optimal tactical formation without tripping over each other or 
shooting one another. 
One of the most important collective CQB drills is the entry drill. In urban combat, it 
is inevitable that at some point, the assault team will have to enter a building or a room 
through a door-way. As the US Marines noted in Fallujah: ‘In traditional MOUT [Military 
Operations in Urban Terrain] training, making non-standard entry points such as walls and 
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windows, is taught. Unfortunately, Marines were responsible for clearing 50 to 60 structures 
a day. There simply was not enough time or explosive to breach the walls or barred windows. 
Almost all the entry points were existing doors’.40 This is one of the most dangerous 
moments for the assault team because the entry point channels the assaulters into a killing 
zone, known as ‘the ‘fatal funnel’. Not only do hostiles within the room know that their 
opponents must cross this area to enter the room (and can therefore aim their fire towards it 
pre-emptively) but typically the doorway casts a shaft of light into the room in which the 
entering soldier is silhouetted.  
Accordingly, the most basic and important collective drill is the entry method; the so-
called ‘five-step entry’. The five-step entry involves a number of interlocking elements which 
are intended to minimize the risks of entry and to eliminate coordination problems. There are 
a number of variations of the basic assault manoeuvre, with team members assuming 
different positions in the room. However, each variation includes five basic requirements; ‘a. 
Clear the doorway. b. Clear the immediate area. c. Clear your corner. d. Sweep your arc of 
fire. e. Establish a dominant position’.41 In a well-executed five-step entry, the stack advances 
smoothly through the door to clear the corners and then establish itself in the ‘dominant 
position’.42 The actions of each member of the stack are standardized: No.1 enters, clearing 
the blind corner, No.2 follows to clear the opposite open corner, No.3 and 4 follow engaging 
threats directly ahead (see Figure 2). All move quickly away from the fatal funnel, until they 
have occupied the dominant position, an imaginary line about a metre or two in front of the 
entry wall.43 On confronting a door, the assault team simply goes through this entry drill on 
the command signal, until the team is stood in the dominant position in the room.  
Indeed, illustrating the point, the five-step entry method is learnt very quickly. After a 
couple of hours of practising in teams, soldiers are able execute the drill and to enter rooms 
quickly and effectively. The simplicity of this drill was demonstrated during a Royal Marine 
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CQB course. When confronted with simple rooms which contained little furniture and were 
of a regular square or oblong shape with no hidden areas, the students quickly demonstrated a 
facility with clearance drills. In these cases, the collective action problem was very simple. 
There were few threats with which to deal and the order of threats was relatively obvious. 
The five-step entry drill could be followed automatically. The team burst into the room, 
cleared the corners and were then presented with empty room everything in which they could 
see. Effectively, the standard entry drill alone was, in and of itself, sufficient to clear this 
room.44 Although simple, the method has been used frequently on operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as this description from an action in Afghanistan in 2006 demonstrates: ‘After 
the explosion the team once again paused just in case the insurgent had survived, however 
there was to be no repeat and the four-man team gave the pre-rehearsed nod of the weapons 
to move into the room and carry out the five step entry drill by covering all aspects of the 
room. Once inside the insurgent was discovered injured but alive, he was treated and returned 
to base’.45  
 
Figure 2. About here 
 
Figure 2: The Five Step Entry sequence. No. 1 and 2 have cleared the near blind and open 
corners by the door. No. 3 enters and clears in depth. 
 
Entry techniques are important but they are inadequate in themselves because rooms 
normally contain numerous threats, which cannot be neutralised by the five-step entry 
method alone. The assault team has to conduct a series of further manoeuvres to check 
unseen corners, hidden spaces or furniture in and behind which insurgents might be hiding; 
the room needs, in short, to be ‘broken down’. The team needs to identity all the threats, 
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prioritise them and assign soldiers to their clearance. Throughout this process, the stack needs 
to operate as a team in order to protect itself and defend against the risk of assault or IED 
strike. At this point, numerous other drills are required to facilitate efficient room clear-
clearance.  
The requirement for a repertoire of drills was illustrated very clearly during a Royal 
Marine training exercise and specifically, the clearance of a single large room in the 
compound (see Figure 1). Initially, the instructors had organized it is a simple square room 
containing a large sofa, chair and television which the students found straightforward to clear. 
The standard five-step entry was adequate to the minimal threats which the room presented. 
However, later in the day, the directing staff reorganized the room so that there was an open 
doorway to an adjacent room on the right wall, opposite which on the left wall was another 
door into a small recess. The furniture also remained. Having entered the room easily before 
the reconfiguration, the student teams now faltered badly. They were disoriented by the open 
doorway into the next room to their right which represented the major threat, since an enemy 
was most likely to hide in that space and shoot from it. They could not work out how to cover 
this space and to clear the room they were in. This was compounded by the fact that opposite 
the open doorway on the right was a closed door into a small alcove on the left, beyond 
which was a hidden corner which also had to be cleared. Teams were at a loss of how to 
assign the task of covering three simultaneous and opposing threats – the open door on the 
right, the closed door on the left and the corner beyond – while clearing the room before 
them. They visibly hesitated on entering the room and became uncertain about how to 
continue and were then incapable of coordinating their actions properly. They were unable to 
prioritize threats and to assign team members to those threats in order so that they could clear 
the room simultaneously. Typically, the teams forgot to cover the open doorway (even 
though it was the greatest threat). Students advanced into the room, crossing the ‘fatal funnel’ 
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created by the doorway on the right and exposing themselves to fire. In some cases, they 
turned their backs to the open door entirely, as they dealt with the closed door to the alcove. 
The directing staff had to physically position the students in the room, pushing and pulling 
them by the body armour so that each individual was addressing all the threats.46 This failure 
to ‘break a room down’ (to identify, prioritise and assign threats) and the inevitable collapse 
of group coordination which ensued was, in fact, extremely common in training.47  
The problem of tactical dis-coordination has been mainly overcome by the 
development of a repertoire of drills. Once teams have expanded their repertoire of collective 
responses, so that they have established procedures for a diversity of situations, squads 
become far more effective in identifying and assigning threats; their drills function as pre-
programmed algorithms which can be called upon to address the situation at hand. For 
instance, in the case of the complex room in the Royal Marines compound, the student’s 
incompetence was resolved later that day. Following from their failures, the students were 
reminded of the ‘body armour to body armour’ drill.48 This involved two assaulters moving 
forward together and simultaneously turning away from each other, their backs touching, 
each addressing a threat to their front and in that way protecting their team-mate’s back. This 
simple but unnatural technique, especially for those trained in open warfare where troops 
would never stand together, solved the problem of how to confront two simultaneous and 
opposite threats without exposing the back of any team-member to a threat. The students 
practiced the body armour to body armour drill and became proficient not only at the drill but 
also when to use it. Accordingly, the room which had proved so difficult to clear, when they 
were ignorant of this drill, became straightforward. 
This episode is important in understanding the role of drills in CQB. There are 
established drills for room and building clearance which soldiers or marines are taught to 
follow together and which can be adapted for a variety of contingencies. Consequently, the 
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most professional Close Quarters Battle troops, and above all the Special Forces, have refined 
their drills to such a point that in the face of almost any structure, assault squads resort to a 
set drill which they have already conducted in training. Ultimately, the best assault teams will 
develop a comprehensive repertoire of collective drills, which acts as an encyclopaedia or a 
programme, for stairwells, corridors, T-junctions, left and right junctions, square, oblong and 
L-shaped rooms for each of which they will implement a specific drill; ‘CQB is like 
basketball or soccer. The ball is constantly moving. You don’t have time to call for play 
number 10 as you do in American football. You know from practice, from experience which 
way to go. That comes from training. If you put the best players from the NBA together into a 
basketball team, they would only be a moderate team, not the best. They don’t know their 
place. You need to train together. But when you put guys together, when they train 
continuously, they will get very good’.49 At this point, drills become so ingrained that every 
member of the assault team can perform any of the functions of the stack: ‘Baseline 
knowledge of the techniques and fundamentals is common to all’.50 Precisely because every 
soldier operates to the same pattern, individuals can initiate a drill on seeing a threat, 
knowing that their team-mates will respond automatically.51 This collective flexibility – 
based on ingrained procedures - is regarded as essential for success. As a result, when these 
highly trained teams encounter an unusual structure or threat on operations they will be best 
positioned to responding to it; they simply apply or adapt the appropriate algorithm. One 
team member will initiate a drill, to which others react in pre-determined ways. Ironically, the 
tactical flexibility of the assault team relies on collective drills inculcated through detailed 
and repetitious forms of training.  
These collective drills are not only important in themselves but, of course, they 
provide the tactical context in which individual skills and above all precision marksmanship 
can be utilized. Highly trained assault teams use the five-step entry and a whole suite of other 
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drills in order to put their members in a position where they can shoot accurately to 
incapacitate or kill their opponents. By extension, the successful execution of collective drills 
also requires highly trained individuals who move in predictable and regulated ways and are 
sufficiently skills to execute drills and to shoot accurately. 
 
Status 
CQB does seem to represent an objective improvement in performance. As the Royal Marine 
example showed, as soldiers learn CQB techniques they are able to clear rooms effectively, 
which once defeated them. Indeed, soldiers, trained in urban combat techniques, have 
observed the improvement in performance and have widely understood the introduction of 
CQB as an advance. For instance, when 40 Commando Royal Marines assaulted Al Faw as 
part of the Iraq invasion in 2003, there were two incidents in which grenades caused friendly 
casualties because they were thrown carelessly.52 For many practitioners, the dissemination 
of CQB represents not just an adaptation but an obvious improvement in military 
effectiveness. The fact that CQB spread so rapidly across western militaries seems to provide 
further evidence that these techniques represent an improvement on existing urban combat 
tactics. In this way, CQB seems to constitute a good example of contemporary special 
forcification. 
 Yet, it would be wrong to presume that this special forcification is purely a matter of 
objective progress or that there was an immediate correlation between improved performance 
at the micro-level and greater operational or institutional effectiveness. Such an ameliorist 
account, though utilised by the armed forces themselves, cannot be accepted as self-evidently 
true. As Jeremy Black has noted the ‘urban turn’ should not be seen so much as a rational 
response but as ‘symptomatic of a set of cultural and political that tell us more about modern 
western society than they do about any objective assessment of military options’.53 Despite its 
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apparent adaptiveness, there are many disadvantages to CQB tactics; it is expensive and time-
consuming and, since urban combat is by no means certain in the future, it is unclear whether 
the investment is worthwhile for regular infantry who may not use the method or who might 
be taught cruder forms of urban tactics (which are cheaper to teach and easier to sustain on 
current training cycles). Moreover, the development of these arcane skills in CQB is almost 
certain to involve a loss of other more traditional – but equally professional - skills. For every 
skill acquired another is lost; yet, the eroded expertise may very well be the one which might 
be crucial in any future campaign. The experience of the US Marines Force Reconnaissance 
Companies illustrates the problem. Investing intensively in CQB techniques in the late 1980s, 
they found that their traditional reconnaissance skills began to erode. Since reconnaissance 
was their prime mission, they were forced to re-prioritise insertion and reconnaissance skills, 
relegating and, in some cases, abandoning CQB training altogether.54  
Indeed, even in Afghanistan where soldiers were operating constantly in and around 
compounds, regular troops found CQB to be only intermittently useful. Only in a tiny 
minority of cases were compound clearances opposed and only in a small number of even 
these dynamic cases did regular troops utilise complete CQB procedures.55 Soldiers and 
marines typically reported that they used specific skills, such as the use of angle and arcs, as 
40 Commando did in Sangin in 2010. In the light of the difficulties and expense of training 
CQB and the uncertainty about its future utility, the acquisition of CQB is minimally 
underdetermined. It is very unclear that the investment in it can be completely justified on a 
strictly utilitarian calculation. Yet, despite this under-determination, the armed forces have 
actively embraced it. It is perhaps worth investigating their un-evidenced alacrity for CQB.  
Notwithstanding the operational utility of CQB, there may be important status elements at 
work in its rapid dissemination. Indeed, CQB may be a practice which is particularly useful 
in status terms. 
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All social practices are invested with cultural and symbolic significance. Yet, CQB 
seems to carry some particularly dense and un-ignorable connotations. Specifically, CQB is a 
Special Forces tactic. It is therefore a combat method closely associated and indeed 
synonymous with troops who enjoy the highest status in the armed forces today. As a result, 
Close Quarter Battle techniques have an allure for the public, politicians and military 
commanders – and indeed for soldiers themselves - that normal infantry tactics (and, 
certainly, traditional ‘spraying and praying’ methods) do not. Illustrating the prestige of these 
specialist techniques, a well-known memoir written by a British SAS soldier in the 1990s was 
called CQB precisely because this title would appeal to the public’s fascination with the 
Special Forces.56 Whatever the actual military value of this expensive capability, the 
performance of these highly trained assault teams has deep cultural resonances which are 
reflected in public imagery, films and video games. While an operational requirement may 
have been identified for the dissemination of urban combat methods to regular infantry, the 
mystique surrounding CQB does not seem to be irrelevant to the rapid dissemination of urban 
tactics along transnational networks. Precisely because it is a high status practice, associated 
with the Special Forces, regular infantry seem to have been motivated to adopt urban combat 
not just because it is definitively the most operationally useful method but because it also 
signifies military expertise most efficiently. By developing CQB competences, western 
armed forces are able to demonstrate their status and to signal to each other than they are 
worthy and competent partners on military operations. The French Army constructed 
CENZUB partly so that it could establish itself as the NATO leader on urban combat as it 
sought to re-integrate into NATO military structures. The French Army seems to have 
recognised the political advantages of investing in a high status activity upon which other 
allies might become dependent. 
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The status dimension seems to be significant in terms of domestic defence politics as 
well. Specifically, precisely because of its symbolic connotations, CQB seems to be a method 
by which regular infantry might be able to defend themselves from reductions in a highly 
competitive budgetary environment. CQB represents not only an extension of the capability 
of the army but also, crucially, it allows the infantry to enjoy some of the prestige of the 
Special Forces by appropriating some of the latter’s traditional skills. In this way, armies may 
accord with Max Weber’s famous and perceptive comments about status groups in Economy 
and Society. There he noted that status groups seek to monopolize ‘ideal and material goods 
or opportunities’57 often by reference to real or putative skills. For Weber, professionalism 
involves not only a set of skills but also a monopoly. More recently, Randall Collins and 
Andrew Abbott58 have shown how professional status groups compete with each other, each 
seeking to defend its own jurisdictions while promoting themselves over others. 
Professionalization has typically arisen as occupational status groups have monopolized 
certain opportunities in industrial society. The naked and self-interested politics of this 
process is evident.5960 
Given the high status of CQB skills, it is possible that the armed forces and, 
specifically, particular combat arms and regiments may be utilising the acquisition of urban 
combat skills as a means of monopolizing or defending ‘ ideal and material’ opportunities 
and especially their budgets, in the way Weber described. It is noticeable, for instance, that 
the construction of new urban training areas has been extremely costly and the forces 
involved have been awarded budgets which might have otherwise gone to other branches or 
services. It seems likely that the aspiration to generate a specialism in CQB attracts financing. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that forces use their CQB skills to advantage themselves over 
their rivals. The Royal Marines have a number of unique capabilities including amphibious 
assault but they have recurrently promoted their CQB competences so that dignitaries 
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especially from the Ministry of Defence visiting their Commando Training Centre are given 
elaborate displays in their urban training compound.61 Significantly, the British Army has 
been worried by these developments. Indeed, a senior Army officer reportedly complained 
that the Royal Marines were two years ahead of the Army in urban combat with the 
potentially serious implications for the Army’s reputation and funding, which followed from 
the Marines lead.62 Indeed, in the UK, the SAS have expressed disquiet at the dissemination 
of specialist techniques which they once monopolized to regular, if elite, troops like the 
Royal Marines. Royal Marine instructors have been dismissively told by members of the SAS 
that if they want to learn CQB, then they should learn to do ‘four k[ilometers] an hour’; this 
is a reference to the speed which SAS candidates are required to march during Selection, 
implying that only badged SAS troopers have the right to earn this skill.63 The SAS are well-
aware of the importance of their monopoly on CQB which they guard jealously.64 They are 
loathe to share these skills. 
Primarily because the US forces have a larger number of Special Forces units than 
other western powers, the dissemination of CQB from SOF to regular infantry has often been 
assumed a more complex and multiple path than in the UK for instance. Nevertheless, a 
status element is detectable even in the United States. Thus, confirming the central argument 
of this article, one SOF officer attributed the dissemination of CQB skills to recent 
operational requirements: ‘I think the biggest cause of the proliferation of these skills to 
conventional forces (army or marine) was the need to execute some form of them daily in 
Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan’.65 However, at the same time, he drew a distinction 
between this official promulgation of CQB tactics to non-SOF forces and their actual ability 
to conduct these tactics effectively: ‘Precise marksmanship comes from the ability to afford 
time and money in bullets at the range.  Therefore, even basic units that say they have a 
capability do not really unless they can get the bullets and the time to train and then are 
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willing to assume to risk to train it live in close quarters’. His point of course was that while 
regular infantry might claim to have attained this skills now (especially since the Special 
Forces ‘dot’ CQB sight could not be attached to their regulation rifles), in many cases, they 
still lacked the crucial aptitude in marksmanship to be able to perform CQB effectively and 
safely. For him, CQB remained the rightful preserve of the Special Forces in much the same 
was as it does for the SAS in the UK. Yet, he fully recognized that regular infantry wanted to 
claim they had these skills because it was institutional advantageous for them to associate 
themselves with the Special Forces. 
The dynamics of special forcification is clearly complex and differentiated nationally. 
However, the evidence from the UK, American and France is that western infantries may be 
acquiring CQB skills not just because these tactics may be the best adapted to future conflict 
but because these skills, signifying the highest levels of professionalism, are also most likely 
to affirm their legitimacy, protect their ‘monopolies’ and to defend their budgets, in a 
Weberian sense. There is some irony to this. Although CQB was initially developed in 
response to a new strategic threat, generated by globalization – terrorism and insurgency – it 
may now be primarily directed against an economic threat. CQB may be a way by which 
regular western infantries can protect themselves from cuts by reference to an apparently 
indispensable form of expertise. Clearly, when considering arbitrary status elements, it is 
important not to overstate the case. Just because status elements may have informed the 
dissemination of a new practice like CQB does not mean that the expertise is itself nugatory 
and illusory. The point is rather the opposite. Even the most manifestly adaptive skills 
involve a status element. Indeed, perhaps those skills which are the most important, most 
useful and, above all, most difficult to master that are subsequently ascribed high status. 
Precisely  because CQB has proven to be effective at the small unit level, its possession is 
highly desirable for regular infantry. 
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Conclusion 
Close Quarters Battle is just one of the many adaptations which western forces have made in 
the light of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, precisely because it has tended to 
be ignored by the scholarship on urban warfare, it is empirically useful to explore this 
military practice in detail. Moreover, because it is a small and definable skill, it is particularly 
useful as a means of understanding the wider dynamics of special forcification. Special 
forcification has been substantially impelled by operational requirements. The military are 
confronted with new threats which they have to address, if they are to avoid defeat, failure 
and professional de-legitimation. Accordingly, the armed forces have developed new 
collective skills which allow them to adapt. The development and dissemination of CQB 
illustrates the way in which small milieus of professional soldiers have understood and 
responded to the urban problem and how new techniques have subsequently been 
disseminated along transnational networks.  However, professionalization is not simply about 
improvement as some accounts of contemporary military transformation have sometimes 
suggested66; it involves monopolization. One of the critical reasons why the armed forces and 
the individual want to avoid defeat is not only because of the strategic consequences but 
because of their damage it inflicts on their reputation, legitimacy and ultimately their 
monopoly on state violence. Various commentators have suggested that urban conflict is 
increasingly likely in the future as more and more people live in cities. That is possible. Yet, 
just because more people live in cities, it does not mean that the next conflict involving 
western forces will take place in one. Conflict over resources in the arctic, jungle or desert are 
also very possible. CQB would be irrelevant in any future war in these areas. However, this 
does not mean that its development is pointless. On the contrary, as a tangible and refined 
skill, CQB serves an important institutional function whatever its operational utility. It 
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represents a high status skill which justifies and sustains the land forces. Moreover, even if 
CQB is not used, the accentuated professionalization of which it is part, is likely to generate 
higher levels of performance among western forces whatever mission they have to conduct 
and wherever they conduct it. Despite extensive investment in urban combat and the 
construction of CENZUB, the French army in Mali did not require CQB skills to succeed. 
However, the army’s professionalism, which the French have been developing since the late 
1990s, allowed them to project a force to the interior of Africa on a highly risky and 
impressive operation.  
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